

پیش بینی اشغال افغانستان از سوی شوروی: سند اجتماع استخباراتی

یا

(داستان کودتاها در افغانستان: از کودتای 26 سرطان تا کودتای ثور و کودتاهای بعدی...)

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برگردان: خلیل

اندکی پیش از آنکه چاپ این مونیوگراف شود، معلومات اضافی راجع به عملکردهای شوروی که منجر به مداخله نظامی در افغانستان شد در دسترس قرار گرفتند. این معلومات از سوی واسیلی میتروخین، یک افسر سابق کی جی بی و متصدی اسناد و پرونده ها بود، که پس از تجزیه اتحاد شوروی، مقدار عظیمی اسناد را به غرب آورد، که شمار نسبتاً زیاد شان تا کنون در آثار دانشمندان برتانوی استفاده شده اند. در رابطه به افغانستان، میتروخین هیچ یک از نسخه (رونوشت) از اسناد افعی را ارایه نه کرده، اما در عوض به شرح و توصیف معلوماتی پرداخته که او از آنها کسب کرده بود (و در بعضی حالات نقل لها یا اقتباساتی ارایه می) در یک مقاله (پیپر) ی که او بطور مخفی در نیمه سالهای 1980-ام به این امید- کنون به حقیقت پیوسته- که روزی قادر شود آن را در اختیار عامه قرار بدهد. **158** بازگویی های میتروخین نه فقط بطور کامل بازگویی های آمده در این مونیوگراف همخوانی دارند، که در واقع او برای تعداد زیادی قضاوت های این مونیوگراف (اسناد) تقویتی مستدل ارایه میدارد، بیشترین به طور برجسته راجع به وسعت تمهیدات (طرحهای) مسکو برای خلاص شدن از شر امی .

بطورمثال، طوری که در متن آمده است، در موقع رویارویی ماه سپتمبر 1979 که منجر به روی کار آمدن امین و قتل تره کی گردید، یک طیف وسیعی از دیدگاهها وجود داشته و به موجودیت اش ادامه میداد این که مسکو تا کدام اندازه در عقب این مساعی خاص، بی طالع (بدبختی) برای برکناری امین قرار داشت. چنان می نماید که میتروخین خواسته این را مسکوت از یک گزارش 1 1979 کی جی بی سخن میزند که بیرونی سیاسی شوروی "نیازمندی برای برکناری امین" را ضه (ارایه) می نماید. **159** میتروخین می گوید این گزارش کی جی بی برای فراهم نمودن موضوع مورد بحث ملاقات بریژنیف با تره کی به تاریخ 10 1979 وقتی که رهبر افغان در مسیر از هاوانا به کابل در مسکو توقیفی داشت، مورد استفاده . گزارشهای میتروخین همچنان به تشریح و توصیف دخالت محرمانه مقامات شوروی در نشستی می پردازد که سکونت گاه تره کی در کابل در خلال اندک روزهای دیگر گرفته، منجر به سوؤ قصد به جان امین در 14 سپتمبر گردید. توضیحات میتروخین از این نشست ها اشاره دارند که تا زمانی که تیر اندازی صورت گرفت، شوروی ها قبلاً چینی ب داشتند که امین اطلاع نهانی بدست آورده و اقدامات پیشگیرانه اتخاذ کرده است، و اینکه چالش برای مقامات شوروی در ک ه عبارت از این بود که بایست از () رویارویی ای جلوگیری شود که منجر به نتایجی حتمی ای گردد که آنها بیشترین از آن هراس داشتند- یعنی تصرف قدرت از سوی امین. بعد از آنکه این کار بالفعل انجام شد، کی جی بی ان را به حیث کودتائی توسط امین گزارش کرد.

میتروخین همچنان داستان های قبلی را تصدیق می کند که سه توطئه گرافغان که امین برای دستگیری شان فرار کردند در سفارت شوروی پناه گرفته، و اندک روزهایی بعد به اتحاد جماهیر شوروی گریزنده شدند. بقول میتروخین هر سه شان سپس در انزوای مؤقت در بلغاریه .

تقریباً فوراً بعد از اعلان مرگ تره کی، بقول میتروخین، اندروپوف - با گرفتن صلاحیت از سوی بریژنیف- به کی جی بی رهنمود داد که با ببرک کارمل در چکو سلواکیا تماس گرفته و مساعی بعدی برای تعویض امین را پلان گذاری نماید. افسران کی جی بی جلساتی را با کارمل در پراگ تدویر کردند، و تا آغاز ماه نوامبر او به مسکو آورده شد، در کنار سه توطئه گران دیگری که در انزوای مؤقت در بلغاریا بودند. آنها و تعداد اندکی از مخالفین امین، که تبعید شده یا ترک افغانستان را برگزیده بودند، گروهی را تشکیل دادند که اسناد کی جی بی از آن به نام "مرکز" یاد می کند. این گروه، به سخنان میتروخین، یک جا با کی جی بی کار کردند" تا یک پلاتفورم سیاسی و پلان های مشخصی را برای برکناری ح. امین از قدرت.... در تحت

(روشنی) رهنمودهای کمیته مرکزی حزب کمونیست اتحاد شوروی تنظیم نمایند که برای رفقای افغان گسیل شده بـ " میتروخین آنچه که ظاهراً یک عبارتی از یک سند این زمان اقتباس میکند.

"... نیروهای سالم ح د خ ا قصد دارند تا از طریق سرنگون ساختن رژیم امین برسرکار بیایند. یک کمیته نظامی ی پلان ی عملیات نظامی و سیاسی برای امحای ح. امین تشکیل شده است... [یکی] از اعضای سابق کمیته مرکزی ح د خ ا ... به افغانستان [فرستاده خواهد شد] تا روابط میان (نیروهای) زیر زمینی و مرکز را تأمین نماید. بعداً... گلاب زوی ... [یکی از توطئه گران] فرستاده می شود تا جنبش ضد امین را بی درنگ () ازماندهی نماید. همه اعضای دیگر مرکز تحت رهبری رفیق کارمل به زودی به نزدیکی های سرحد افغانستان خواهند رفت بتوانند بطور مؤثرتر و مخفیانه کار نمایند. مرکز قبلاً رئوس پلان نظامی را ترتیب نموده که شامل یک عملیات سریع نظامی درپای تخت برای امحای فزیک ح. امین است...."

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پلان ها خواهان اعطای موقعیت نمبر دوم در رژیم جدید کارمل به سروری، یعنی رئیس قبلی نیروهای استخبارات در رژیم تره کی و یکی از توطئه گران درمسابی ماه سپتمبر برای برکنار کردن امین . مطابق سند دیگر استند میتروخین، "مرکز" کا ل به تاریخ 12 دسمبر به ساحه نزدیکی سرحد منتقل شد.

میتروخین همچنان معلوماتی را - از اسنادی در رابطه به تعبیه واحد های مختلف (متنوع) عساکر شوروی ب داخل افغانستان را در قبل از مداخله بازگو می نماید- راجع به رخنه کردن نیروهای خاص ب داخل کابل، در حقیقت، به منظور آنچه که "جوخه ضربه" (دسته آتش) گفته می شد، که کاملاً با داوری های مرتبه از سوی تحلیل گران آن زمان، که در متن این پیپر تشریح یف شده اند مطابقت دارد. او می گوید که این نیروها برای مقاصد مشخص آماده سازی و در نهایت انجام آنچه که " ملیات آگات" (Operation Agat) یعنی امحای امین، نام گرفته بود، رخنه کرده بودند. در حالیکه این عساکر از بخشهای متنوع شوروی تشکیل شده بودند، میتروخین این وظیفه بخصوص امحای امین را طوری تشریح و توضیح میکند که به " 8-ام مدیریت S نخستین F[irst] رئیس مدیریت D[irectorate] (فرماندهی) C[hief] " کی جی بی، یعنی اداره مسئول "عملیات های خاص" 161. دو تا از تعیین ماموریت های تفصیلی را که میتروخین به حیث بخشی از پروسه آمادگی توصیف می کند شامل "مطالعه [درباره] خطوط ارتباطی محل رهايشی جدید امین"، (که برایش دو نفر متخصص به تاریخ 7 مبر فرستاده شدند) و بازبینی (استراق سمع) نشرات رادیوی کابل- شهر دوشنبه، آنسوی سرحد در اتحاد جماهیر شوروی- برای ارایه نظریات برای اقداماتی که برای شما روشن است." (این کار برای ریزیدنسی (نمایندگی) کی جی بی محول شده بود، تا دقیقاً چگونگی استفاده از آن برای نشر اعلامیه ای که کارمل داشت برای می آمد، مورد بازبینی قرارگیرد.)

آنچه که بطور مساوی راجع به تشریحات و توضیحات مطالب ارایه شده توسط میتروخین درخور توجه است اینکه او تفصیل اضافی در مورد مساعی قتل امین به تاریخ 17 دسمبر پیش کش نمی کند، و ، در واقع، نسبت به آنچه که در منابع آن زمان آمده تفصیل کمتری ارایه می نماید. یگانه منبع و مأخذ میتروخین برای آن تاریخ عبارت است از یک بیانیه ای که به تاریخ 17 گاردهای شوروی در گرداگرد محل سکونت امین تعبیه شده بودند. با در نظر داشت شیوه ای که این مساعی قتل اجرا گردید، تعجب برانگیز نه خواهند بود که اسناد (مدارک) گزارش های رسمی کی جی بی شاید یک مقدار پراکنده بوده

پایان قسمت 12- ادامه دارد

[158. This information is now available in "The KGB in Afghanistan," CHIHP Special Working Paper No. 40, \(Washington, DC, Woodrow Wilson Center, February 2002\). The large volume of information from documents that Mitrokhin brought out from the KGB archives is presented in detail in Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, \(New York, NY: Basic Books, 1999\).](#)

159. Ibid., Page 52.

160. This quotation and the descriptions in the following paragraphs are on pages 92-95 of Mitrokhin's paper.

161. Ibid.

بقیه زیر نویس ها از قسمت 1) 6 (1 75):

1. The study was carried out by the DCI's Senior Review Panel, a special advisory group of seasoned policy and intelligence veterans. The Panel was established by Robert Bowie, CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence in the late 1970s, out of concern for what he believed to be qualitative shortcomings in NIEs and other assessments. The Panel's report, examining 12 cases of "failure," was delivered to the DCI on 16 December 1983. A summary description of the purposes and findings of this study appeared the following year in the classified edition of *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Fall 1984), under the title "The Hazards of Single-Outcome Forecasting," pp. 57-70. It listed as its authors the four members of the Senior Review Panel at the time: Willis C. Armstrong, William Leonhart, William McCaffrey, and Herbert C. Rothenberg. This *Studies* article was later declassified and appears in H. Bradford Westerfield (ed.), *Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-92*, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1995) pp. 238-254. (The specific case of Afghanistan appears on pp. 253-54.)

2. The historical summary in this section is drawn from the following: Abdul Samad Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider's Account* (McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), pp. 79-193; Raja Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan: A First Hand Account* (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 33-91; Henry Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, 2nd ed., (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985), pp. 17-74; Anthony Arnold, *The Fatal Pebble: Afghanistan's Role in the Fall of the Soviet Empire* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), pp. 47-57; and Selig Harrison in Diego Cordovez and Selig Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 14-24. Ghaus served as a deputy foreign minister under Daoud, and Anwar was in Pakistan's government until the 1977 military takeover there, after which he resided in exile in Afghanistan. Both he and Ghaus spent time in prison in Afghanistan after the Soviet intervention. Bradsher was a journalist with extensive experience in Afghanistan; Arnold was a CIA officer who served in Afghanistan in the mid 1970s, and Harrison is a regional expert and former journalist now with The Carnegie Institute. Not surprisingly, all have different in perspectives, although they agree on the main facts.

3. See Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 675-677, and 687.

4. According to Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, p. 15, citing a 1985 publication in Moscow by the Institute of Oriental Studies, *The History of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan 1947-1977*, the Soviet-trained Afghan military officers who backed Daoud's power seizure were an underground

group called the "Armed Forces Revolutionary Organization" that had been formed in 1964 with the encouragement of the Soviet military intelligence arm (GRU).

5. Former Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin gives Moscow's explicit view of the two factions in his book *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to Six Presidents* (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 434.

6. See Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, pp. 47 and 63, and Arnold, *The Fateful Pebble*, p. 54.

7. The Khalq paper, which propagated the Taraki-Amin opposition line, was shut down by the regime shortly after it started publishing in the spring of 1966. The Karmal-backed Parcham opened in 1968, and in 1969 was also shut down.

8. Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 76. According to Anwar, the Khalq opposition stance did not keep the faction—after Daoud broke his relationship with Parcham—from offering support to Daoud's government. The offer was turned down.

9. Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 68 (re the quoted passage) and pp. 71-72 on Parcham claims about persuading Daoud. Similar descriptions are given in Arnold, *The Fateful Pebble*, p. 53; Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan*, p. 107; and Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, p. 14.

10. Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan*, p. 159.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 165; also Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, pp. 15-16. Harrison cites an interview with a Russian specialist on Afghanistan as the source for the Soviet perspectives on Parcham.

12. Cordovez and Harrison, pp. 15-16; Ghaus, pp. 153-155. Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 76, says the Iranian aid agreement in mid-1974 came to \$1 billion, with a promise to double it in a year.

13. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in multi-ethnic Afghanistan, accounting for roughly 40 percent of its population. The number of Pashtuns in Pakistan—located mainly in the northwest region—is even larger, but because of the immensely greater overall population of Pakistan they are a national minority and this has been manifest in their socio-political status. The border that divides the Pashtuns between the two states is a legacy of British colonialism in the region, created in the late 19th century as a frontier defense line. It was subsequently ratified by the UN in 1947 as the national border of the newly independent state of Pakistan—and was immediately disavowed by Afghanistan and has been a source of continuing conflict between the two states.

14. This view was shared both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. See Ghaus, p. 142, and Anwar, pp. 82-83.

15. See Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, pp. 78-81 (the Pakistan perspective); and Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan*, pp. 110-121 (the perspective from the Daoud regime.)

16. Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 80.

17. Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, p. 16. Harrison states that he obtained information on the "loose collaboration" from William H. Lewis, who helped implement these programs as Director of Political-Military Affairs at the State Department.

18. Ghaus, pp. 111, 115, 121, 154-155; Cordovez and Harrison, pp.19-20, citing an interview with Daoud.

19. Arnold, *The Fateful Pebble*, p. 53.

20. There are contradictory views of whether the Soviets might also have urged Daoud to enter talks. Anwar, in *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 81, says they did; Ghaus, in *The Fall of Afghanistan*, p. 120, denies it. The Soviets' alleged motive was the possibility, implied by Bhutto's reasonably friendly visit to Moscow in October 1974, of improving relations with Pakistan and thereby undermining the US regional security framework.

21. Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 76; Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, pp. 60-67; Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan*, pp. 121, 149, and 163; Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, p. 17. Harrison says Daoud also removed 200 Soviet-trained military officers at this time, but this contradicts Ghaus's description (pp. 190-191) of Daoud's approach to dealing with the military. (See following note.) Anwar, who says he discussed the military purges with one of the dismissed officers, also does not mention this higher figure.

22. Anwar, p. 76; Ghaus, pp. 190-194; Cordovez and Harrison, p. 17. Anwar says that by this time Daoud had removed every known communist 'from the government,' but may have been referring to the cabinet-level positions. Ghaus claims the 'government' was not completely purged until 1977.

23. *Ibid* . Ghaus does not mention the dismissal of 40 officers, but Anwar says he was given this figure by the same dismissed officer cited in footnote 19, above.

24. Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan*, pp. 124-150, 193. As Deputy Foreign Minister, Ghaus was directly involved in the negotiations and served as interpreter for the one-on-one talks between Daoud and Bhutto. He provides a highly detailed, intimate account.

25. Ghaus, p. 193; Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, p. 20.

26. Ghaus, pp. 179-180. (Ghaus was an eyewitness.) Harrison, in *Out of Afghanistan*, p. 21, cites Ghaus's description and says he received the same description from the Afghan foreign minister, who also was present.

27. Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan*, pp. 140-148, 154-159; Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, pp. 21-22.

28. Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, pp. 85-89; Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, pp. 67-72; Ghaus, pp. 171-194; Cordovez and Harrison, pp. 17-18. Also Arnold, *The Fateful Pebble*, p. 53, who notes that the final reunification agreement was reached at a meeting held in India. Anwar says the Soviet push for reunification began as early as 1975.

29. Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, pp. 92-101; Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, pp. 74-77; Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, pp. 22-28; Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan*, pp. 194-200. Each of the authors gives a slightly different timing for each of the steps. For the most part, they differ only by a few hours, except for Ghaus's statement that Amin was not taken into custody until the morning of 27 April. This does not fit with the timing he and other authors give for other events he describes, and may be an editorial error.

30. Anwar, p. 111, gives a list of the new government's lineup.

31. Declassified Interagency Intelligence Memoranda (IIM), *Soviet Options in Afghanistan*, 28 September 1979, p. 5; and *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, October 1980, p. 6. Both were declassified as part of CIA's historical review program and are available from the Historical Review staff. The October 1980 document was prepared as an Intelligence Community review of intelligence warnings leading up to the Soviet invasion in December 1979, and describes the flow of evidence available to analysts during that time frame. Regarding the sightings of Soviet advisors with army units carrying out the action, see Cordovez and Harrison, pp. 27 and 32, and Ghaus, pp. 197-198.

32. Among just a portion of the diverse perspectives are Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, pp. 90-94, and 102-103; Arnold, *The Fateful Pebble*, pp. 52-55 and 89-92; Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, pp. 76-81; Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, pp. 27-28; Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, pp. 985-987, and Ghaus, *The Fall of Afghanistan*, pp. 195-198.

33. IIMs *Soviet Options in Afghanistan*, p. 4, and *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p.6. See also Arnold, *The Fateful Pebble*, p. 93, and Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, p. 30.

34. Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, pp. 116-121, gives a detailed account of the machinations of this purge. See also Arnold, p. 95; Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, pp. 87-89, and Cordovez and Harrison, pp. 29-30.

35. IIMs *Soviet Options in Afghanistan*, p. 6, and *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p. 8.

36. Cyrus Vance, *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 384; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of a National Security Advisor* (New York, Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1983), pp. 426-428; Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, pp. 32-34. Harrison attributes his information to interviews with National Security Advisor Brzezinski and Undersecretary of State David Newsom.

37. Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 388; Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, pp. 32-35. The Iranian visit is described in Michael Ledeen and William Lewis, *Debate: The American Failure in Iran* (New York, Vintage Books, 1982), p. 96.

38. Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, pp. 119-123; Arnold, *The Fateful Pebble*, pp. 95-96; Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, p. 30. Arnold argues (p. 96) that it is unlikely Karmal could have arranged the coup before he left in July and that it is therefore more likely the September plot was arranged between Moscow and its sympathizers in the Afghan army.

39. IIM, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p. 8.

40. Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, p. 123; Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, p. 30.

41. Anwar, pp. 118, and 125-150; Arnold, *The Fateful Pebble*, pp. 57 and 97; Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, pp. 90-96. Cordovez and Harrison, pp. 30-32. Anwar's detailed, close-up and in-depth examination of the incompatibility of the Marxist-Leninist program and the Afghan social structure is a notably objective appraisal by someone who himself has been part of a more leftist regime.

42. IIM, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p. 8.

43. IIM, *Soviet Options in Afghanistan*, p. 8.

44. Vance, *Hard Choices*, p. 388; Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, p. 34; "Guerillas Train In Afghanistan to Oust Afghan Government," *The Washington Post*, 2 February 1979, p. A23.

45. Anwar, *The Tragedy of Afghanistan*, pp. 153-154; IIMs, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, pp. 8-9, and *Soviet Options in Afghanistan*, pp. 6 and 8. According to Anwar, citing discussions with fellow prisoners, the commander of the Asadabad garrison would later become one of the leaders of the Afghan guerrilla units in the eastern provinces opposing the Soviet intervention forces.

46. Anwar, pp. 154-155; Arnold, *The Fateful Pebble*, p. 99; Cordovez and Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan*, pp. 34-35; IIM, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p. 9.

47. IIM, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, pp. 9-10. Accounts in subsequent years said the number of Soviet advisors killed was at least nine and perhaps 40, and put the number of Afghan deaths at from 800 to 3,000. See Anwar, p. 157, and Cordovez and Harrison, pp. 35-36.

48. The leadership shuffle was announced publicly on 18 March (reported by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the Embassy).

49. A "Motorized Rifle Division" was essentially an infantry, or ground troops, division equipped with armored transport vehicles and including units equipped with tanks, artillery and other weapons.

50. IIM, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, pp. 10 and 47 (for locations of the divisions).

51. The author was present for these debates.

52. *National Intelligence Daily*, 23 March 1979, quoted in IIM, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p. 15.

53. IIM, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p. 10.

54. *Ibid.* , p. 13.

55. *Ibid.* ; and IIM, *Soviet Options in Afghanistan*, pp. 6 and 8.

56. IIM, *Soviet Options in Afghanistan*, p.9, and IIM, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, pp. 14-15, which cites a "pro and con" assessment disseminated 16 June 1979.

57. IIMs, *Soviet Options in Afghanistan*, pp. 9-10, and *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, pp. 10-12, 15 and 20.

58. "Moscow Said to Urge Shaky Afghan Regime to Broaden Base," *The New York Times*, 2 August 1979, p. A10. Also US Embassy Kabul 5493 of 22 July and Kabul 5627 of 25 July, at the National Security Archive. These cables are in a compendium entitled "The Intervention in Afghanistan and the Fall of Détente," compiled for a 1995 Nobel Symposium in Oslo, Norway, hereafter referred to as the Nobel Compendium. See also Garthoff's description of other State Department reporting cables in *Détente and Confrontation*, p. 1001, footnote 61.

59. US Embassy Kabul 5493, 22 July 79; IIMs, *Soviet Options in Afghanistan*, p.10, and *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p. 2; *The New York Times*, 2 August 1979, op. cit.

60. IIMs, *Soviet Options in Afghanistan*, p. 7, and *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, pp. 16-17.

61. IIMs, *Soviet Options in Afghanistan*, pp. 6-7, and *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, pp. 16-17; *The New York Times*, 2 August 1979, op. cit.

62. Charles Cogan, "Partners in Time: The CIA and Afghanistan," *World Affairs Journal*, Summer 1993, p. 76; Robert M. Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 146; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, op. cit., p. 427.

63. "US Indirectly Pressing Russians....," *The New York Times*, 3 August 1979, p. A1.

64. IIM, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p. 17; US Embassy Kabul 5967, 6 August 1979.

65. This was then a relatively new position created by the DCI specifically to highlight potential crises early in their development. See IIM, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p. 63, regarding memoranda prepared for the National Intelligence Officer for Warning. The description of this specific memorandum is based on the personal knowledge of the author, who was working virtually full time on the military dimensions of Soviet activities related to the Afghan situation from Spring 1979 through the Soviet invasion. Other descriptions herein of intelligence reporting and assessments informed by the author's personal participation are so identified.

66. IIMs *Soviet Options in Afghanistan*, p.10, and *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p.17.

67. IIMs *Soviet Options in Afghanistan*, pp.10 and 14, and *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p. 21, plus author's participation.

68. Gates, *From the Shadows*, op cit., p.132, citing a still-classified report of 24 August 1979.

69. US Embassy Kabul 6604, 2 September 1979, and Kabul 6672, 6 September 1979, Nobel Compendium.

70. US Embassy Kabul 6672, 6 September 1979.

71. "Soviet Role in Afghan Clash Shows Signs of Toughening," *The New York Times*, 6 September 1979, p. A2.

72. IIM, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, pp. 17-18.

73. *Ibid.*; IIM, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, pp. 18 and 21, quoting the *National Intelligence Daily* of 7 September 1979.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 21, and author's personal knowledge.

75. IIM, *The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, p. 21; Gates, *From the Shadows*, pp. 132-133.